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NOTES
GETTING AT THE TRUTH: ADVERSARIAL HEARINGS
IN BATSON INQUIRIES
INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the problem
of racial discrimination in jury selection.I Where a criminal defendant is
tried before a jury from which members of his racial group have been
purposely excluded by the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges,2
the Court has recognized two equal protection violations. First, the de-
fendant is denied the right to be tried by persons who are selected pursu-
ant to nondiscriminatory criteria.3 Second, the excluded jurors are
denied the opportunity to participate in the criminal justice system.4
1. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (peremptory challenges); see, e.g.,
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (grand jury selection); Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202 (1965) (peremptory challenges); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (sys-
tematic exclusion of persons of Mexican descent); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953)
(jury selection using colored tickets to represent race); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463
(1947) (absence of black jurors for over 30 years); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939) (purposeful discrimination by jury commissioners); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587 (1935) (exclusion of blacks from jury lists); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881)
(exclusion of blacks from petit and grand juries); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)
(judge's purposeful discrimination); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (stat-
ute declaring blacks ineligible for jury service).
2. Before a jury is impanelled, each potential juror advances through three stages in
the jury selection process. See J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain
Commitment to Representative Panels 85-175 (1977). The first stage of selection is as-
sembling the jury wheel-the list of prospective jurors-usually from a list of registered
or actual voters. See id. at 85-109. The second, or excuse stage, consists of disqualifica-
tions, exemptions and discretionary excuses. See id. at 111-37. The third stage, voir dire,
consists of the elimination of jurors through challenges for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges. See id. at 139-75.
A challenge for cause eliminates biased jurors and must be based on a "narrowly speci-
fied, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality," such as a previous relationship
between a juror and the defendant. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. The number of chal-
lenges for cause on either side is unlimited. See J. Van Dyke, supra, at 140.
A peremptory challenge, however, may be exercised "without a reason stated, without
inquiry, and without being subject to the court's control." Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. Each
state determines how many peremptory challenges the defense and prosecution may util-
ize. For a survey of the number of peremptory challenges in each state, see J. Van Dyke,
supra, at 281-84 app. D.
3. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
0. See id. at 87. Aside from these constitutional violations, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the defendant and the excluded jurors were not the only persons
wronged. See id. Racial discrimination injury selection creates harm that "touch[es] the
entire community" and "undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice." Id.; see also Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986) (per curiam) ("Our [Bat-
son] holding ensures that States do not discriminate against citizens who are summoned
to sit in judgment against a member of their own race and strengthens public confidence
in the administration of justice.").
Allen held that Batson did not apply retroactively to a case on federal habeas corpus
review. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 260-61. A few months later, the Court held that Batson
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Even though the impermissible exercise of peremptory challenges in-
fringed upon a fundamental right, it remained oppressively difficult for
defendants to succeed on their equal protection claims.5 Then, in Batson
v. Kentucky,6 the Supreme Court revised the evidentiary formulation for
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the jury selec-
tion process, thereby better securing defendants' and jurors' equal protec-
tion rights.7
The Batson Court declared that the defendant, who bears the burden
of proving purposeful discrimination, must make a prima facie showing.8
This essentially requires the defendant to show membership in a racially
cognizable group and to offer any other relevant circumstances that raise
an inference of racially discriminatory intent.9 Those circumstances may
arise solely from the defendant's case.10 If the defendant succeeds, the
burden then shifts to the state to give neutral and legitimate reasons for
its peremptory challenges."
In devising this general framework, the Court declined to establish
specific procedures for executing its decision. It stated that "[i]n light of
the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state and federal
trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to
implement our holding today."' 2 Consequently, federal and state courts
have disagreed about the procedural requirements of Batson, and are di-
vided over whether the defendant has the right to rebut the prosecutor's
explanations in an adversarial hearing. Some courts require adversarial
hearings, 3 while others endorse evidentiary hearings in which the de-
fendant has the right to call witnesses, including the prosecutor, and offer
evidence. 4 Still other courts hold that the decision whether to hold a
hearing at all is at the trial court's discretion.'"
This Note argues that once a defendant makes a prima facie showing
of purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor attempts to rebut that
presumption, the defendant must have an opportunity to rebut the prose-
did apply retroactively to all federal and state cases pending on direct review. See Griffith
v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987).
5. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
6. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
7. See id. at 93-98.
8. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
9. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Batson has been applied to numerous racial groups.
See, e.g., United States v. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1987) (Hispanics); United
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987) (American Indians), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 534 (1988); United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (Italian-Ameri-
cans), aff'd, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1312 (1989).
10. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95.
11. See id. at 97.
12. Id. at 99 n.24. Based on the past experience of state courts that had implemented
a version of the Batson evidentiary standard, the Court anticipated that its holding would
create no serious administrative burdens. See id. at 99.
13. See cases cited infra note 130.
14. See cases cited infra note 121.
15. See cases cited infra note 117.
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cutor's explanations in an adversarial hearing, absent a compelling gov-
ernment interest. 6 Part I examines the evolution of the defendant's
evidentiary burden for proving an equal protection violation. Part II
analyzes the procedural due process problems that arise if non-adver-
sarial proceedings follow Batson objections. It also demonstrates how
Title VII procedures, which are analogous to a Batson inquiry, support
the defendant's right to rebut the prosecution's explanation. Part III
evaluates the three types of hearings that federal and state courts have
implemented and urges the use of adversarial hearings as the most just
and reliable procedural choice. This Note concludes that an adversarial
hearing following a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination is
constitutionally mandated to ensure that procedural due process and
equal protection are not violated.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Swain v. Alabama
Prior to Batson, the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama 7 held that a
defendant who claimed that a prosecutor's peremptory challenges were
racially discriminatory had to demonstrate systematic exclusion of a
group of jurors from the jury venirel s beyond the facts of the defendant's
own case. In Swain, after the defendant was convicted and sentenced to
death, he moved to quash his indictment, strike the venire and declare
the petit jury" void on the basis of invidious discrimination in the jury
selection.2 °
The defendant offered statistical evidence concerning the racial com-
position of the petit and grand juries in his county to support his claim.2'
Based on this showing, the defendant argued that the state had continu-
ously and systematically discriminated against black jurors by perempto-
rily striking them.22
The Court, however, found that the evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case of invidious discrimination.23 In response to the
16. See infra note 79 (discussing government interests).
17. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
18. The venire is the group of persons summoned to serve as jurors from which a petit
jury is chosen. See Black's Law Dictionary 1395 (5th ed. 1979).
19. The petit jury is the finder of fact at trials as opposed to the grand jury which
determines whether an indictment is warranted.
20. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 203.
21. The evidence submitted showed that only 10 to 15 percent of the grand and petit
jury panels were black, despite the fact that black males over the age of twenty-one con-
stituted 26 percent of the male population in the county. See id. at 205. More specifi-
cally, in the defendant's case only four or five black persons (the trial record was unclear
about the exact number) were on the jury panel of about thirty-three and only two actu-
ally served on the grand jury that indicted him. See id. The defendant also submitted
evidence that although there were six to seven blacks on the average petit jury venire, no
black had actually served on a petit jury in that county since about 1950. See id.
22. See id. at 210.
23. See id. at 206.
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claim that blacks were underrepresented by as much as 10 percent, the
Court ruled that a defendant was not constitutionally entitled to demand
a proportionate number of his race on his jury or on the venire from
which jurors were drawn.24 Furthermore, it found no evidence that the
exclusion of potential black jurors was intentional.
Reluctant to limit the nature and operation of the peremptory chal-
lenge, 6 the Court refused to require scrutiny of the prosecutor's motives
for striking jurors. Emphasizing the important function of peremptory
challenges to ensure an impartial jury, 7 the Swain Court asserted that
examining the prosecutor's challenges in any particular case where all
blacks were removed was not constitutionally required.2" Rather, it held
that a presumption existed that a prosecutor properly exercised peremp-
tory challenges to obtain a fair jury, and that the facts in a particular case
could not overcome this presumption.29
24. See id. at 208.
25. See id. at 209.
26. The Court stressed the "very old credentials" of peremptory challenges and re-
counted their operation in England and this country. See id. at 212-18. In England, the
Crown could remove an unlimited number of jurors without reason. See J. Van Dyke,
supra note 2, at 147. In 1305, Parliament, in an effort to reform these "hand-picked"
juries, passed a statute requiring the Crown to challenge for "cause certain." See id. In
response, English judges created the right of "standing jurors aside," which assumed that
whenever the Crown's attorneys wanted to challenge a juror, cause existed. See id. at
148. If 12 unchallenged jurors could be impanelled, which almost always occurred be-
cause many were summoned to serve, then the jurors asked to "stand aside" were dis-
missed permanently. See id.
27. Finding that peremptory challenges persisted over time and were widely used, the
Court reaffirmed its belief that although not constitutionally required, they were "one of
the most important of the rights secured to the accused." See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219
(citing Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)). The peremptory challenge
permits a prosecutor or defense counsel to remove a juror without explanation to, or
inquiry by, the court for reasons that are based on "'sudden impressions and unaccount-
able prejudices .... "' Id. at 220 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376
(1892)). The peremptory challenge serves the crucial functions of "eliminat[ing] ex-
tremes of partiality on both sides," and of removing the juror who might become hostile
after an unsuccessful challenge for cause. Id. at 219-20; see also Babcock, Voir Dire:
Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 554-55 (1975) (searching for
reasons to challenge a juror for cause through questioning may so alienate a potential
juror that he must be peremptorily challenged); Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Chal-
lenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev. 337,
356 (1982) (same).
28. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 222. Because the Court found cases where "race, religion,
nationality, occupation or affiliations" were "widely explored during the voir dire" or
constituted the grounds of a challenge for cause, it would not hold that peremptory chal-
lenges of black persons in a particular case resulted in an equal protection violation. See
id. at 220-22.
29. See id. In response to the defendant's claims that there had never been a black
person on a petit jury in Talladega County and that prosecutors had consistently and
systematically exercised their challenges to prevent blacks from serving on the petit jury,
the Court stated that "the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome."
Id. at 223-24. The proof would have to indicate that the prosecution had "in case after
case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the
victim," excluded blacks "from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the
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In his dissent, Justice Goldberg pointed out a "fundamental defect" in
Swain.3" He believed that the fact that no black person had ever served
on a petit jury in Talladega County was sufficient to establish a prima
facie case under settled decisions of the Court.31 The majority, however,
chose to impose upon the defendant the additional burden of proving the
prosecution's systematic striking of blacks over a number of cases, not
just in the defendant's case, because purposeful exclusion from the petit
jury, rather than the jury panel, was alleged.32 Justice Goldberg criti-
cized this baffling distinction and the majority's view of the importance
of preserving the right of peremptory challenges.33
For the next twenty-one years, almost every defendant who claimed
that the state used its peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely on
the basis of race failed to meet the Swain standard.34 The evidentiary
burden required the defendant "to investigate, over a number of cases,
the race of persons tried in the particular jurisdiction, the racial composi-
tion of the venire and petit jury, and the manner in which both parties
exercised their peremptory challenges., 35
B. Batson v. Kentucky
The Batson Court recognized that the Swain standard placed a "crip-
pling burden of proof" on defendants.36 Consequently, it reformulated
the evidentiary burden to allow the accused to establish a prima facie
case from evidence in the instant case, without referring to previous
cases.
37
In Batson, the defendant, a black male, was indicted on charges of
second degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 38 During the jury
selection, the prosecutor struck all four black persons on the venire, and
an all-white jury was selected.39 Defense counsel moved to discharge the
particular case on trial and that the peremptory system [was] being used to deny the
Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice en-
joyed by the white population." Id. The Court declined to pursue this matter any fur-
ther because Swain offered no proof of any instances outside his case where the
prosecutor was responsible for impermissibly striking black jurors. See id. at 224-27.
30. See id. at 238 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
31. See id.; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587 (1935). Patton and Norris involved exclusion from the jury venire, not the petit jury.
In these cases, once a prima facie case was made, the burden of proof shifted to the state
to rebut defendant's showing. See Patton, 332 U.S. at 466; Norris, 294 U.S. at 597-98.
32. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 239 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
33. See id. at 239-42.
34. See Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987
Sup. Ct. Rev. 97, 99-100 (1987); Comment, Deterring the Discriminatory Use of Peremp-
tory Challenges, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 477, 485 (1984).
35. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 n.17 (1986) (citing United States v. Pearson,
448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971)).
36. See id. at 92.
37. See id. at 95-98.
38. See id. at 82.
39. See id. at 83.
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jury before it was sworn in, alleging that the prosecutor had violated the
defendant's fourteenth amendment right to equal protection.4 ° The trial
judge denied the motion, observing that both counsel were entitled to
"strike anybody they wanted to" when they used their peremptory chal-
lenges.41 On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court, relying on Swain,
affirmed the trial court.42
The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that the prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely on
the basis of race violated the defendant's right to equal protection.43
1. Equal Protection
In Batson, the Court reaffirmed the principle that the state's deliberate
denial to black citizens of the opportunity to serve as jurors violates the
equal protection clause.4 Because such purposeful exclusion exemplified
one of the "evil[s] the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to cure," the
Court avowed its continuing efforts to "eradicate racial discrimination in
the procedures used to select the venire from which individual jurors are
drawn."
45
Moreover, the Court maintained that racially discriminatory selection
practices deny the defendant "the protection that a trial by jury is in-
tended to secure" as well as the inherent safeguards "against the arbi-
trary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge."46  The Court
40. See id. On appeal, the defendant also alleged that his sixth amendment right to a
jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community was violated. See id. The
Supreme Court expressed no view on the sixth amendment arguments. See id. at 85 n.4.
41. See id. at 83.
42. See id. at 83-84.
43. See id. at 89 (7-2 decision). Justices White and O'Connor concurred, but asserted
that the decision should not be applied retroactively. See id. at 102, 111 (White &
O'Connor, J.J., concurring). Justice Marshall, also concurring, advocated the elimina-
tion of peremptory challenges entirely. See id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring). Jus-
tices Stevens and Brennan concurred, but noted the inconsistency of finding an equal
protection violation despite petitioner's sole reliance on sixth amendment grounds. See
id. at 108-09 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Burger filed a dissent in which Justice
Rehnquist joined. See id. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
44. See id. at 84. The equal protection clause prohibits the state from making invidi-
ous classifications and guarantees that people who are similarly situated will be treated
similarly. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). See generally J. Nowak, R.
Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law § 14.1-2, at 523-28 (3d ed. 1986) (application of
equal protection to government actions).
45. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85. The Batson Court also emphasized the unconstitutional
discrimination against the excluded juror. See id. at 87. The prospective juror, who is
denied the opportunity to serve on a jury because of his race, has standing to raise an
equal protection claim. His interests are also implicated once a prima facie case is
established.
46. See id. at 86. The Court declared that "[d]iscrimination within the judicial sys-
tem is most pernicious because it is 'a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impedi-
ment to securing to [black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others.'" See id. at 87-88 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
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subsequently devised procedural requirements to uphold the principles of
equal protection.
2. The Revised Evidentiary Burden of Batson
According to the Court's reformulation of the evidentiary burden, the
defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimina-
tion.47 To determine whether the defendant has made the requisite
showing, "the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. ' 48
If the defendant makes this prima facie showing, the burden of proof
then shifts to the prosecutor to rebut the showing by offering neutral and
legitimate explanations for striking the jurors.49
A prosecutor may not rebut the prima facie case by claiming that he
exercised a peremptory challenge on the assumption that the juror would
be partial towards the defendant on account of shared race.50 Such a
presumption would violate the equal protection clause because it would
be tantamount to an exclusion of the juror solely on the basis of race.5'
Moreover, the prosecutor may not merely deny having a discriminatory
motive or claim that peremptory challenges were exercised in good
faith.5
2
The trial judge must then determine whether the defendant has estab-
lished purposeful discrimination. 3 Because the trial court's finding
largely turns on the evaluation of credibility, an appellate court should
usually defer to those factual findings. 4
The Court, however, declined to formulate specific procedures that
trial courts must follow once a defendant objects to the prosecutor's use
of peremptory challenges.55 Because of this lack of guidance, three diver-
47. To establish a prima facie case,
the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group,
and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from
the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to
rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are
of a mind to discriminate.' Finally, the defendant must show that these facts
and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor
used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of
their race.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 96-97. The Court suggested two examples that might support or refute an
inference of discriminatory intent: the "pattern" of strikes against jurors of a cognizable
racial group or the prosecutor's questions during voir dire. See id. at 97.
49. See id. The explanation must somehow relate to the defendant's case. See id. at
98. They need not, however, qualify as a challenge for cause. See id. at 97.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 97-98.
52. See id. at 98 (citation omitted).
53. See id. at 98.
54. See id. at 98 n.21. The standard for appellate review of aBatson inquiry is beyond
the scope of this Note.
55. See id. at 99; supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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gent approaches have developed. Some lower courts interpret Batson as
requiring either an evidentiary56 or an adversarial hearing, 7 while others
allow the prosecution to explain its strikes in a non-adversarial, ex parte
proceeding.58
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROBLEMS RAISED By
NON-ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Procedural Due Process
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments pro-
hibit, respectively, the federal government and the states from depriving
a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 9 The
government must provide procedural safeguards whenever these interests
are involved. At a minimum, the government must give notice and a fair
opportunity to be heard "'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.' "6o
The non-adversarial inquiries in post-Batson cases are usually in the
form of ex parte proceedings.6' Some appellate courts have affirmed trial
court decisions to hear the prosecutor's explanations ex parte and in
camera. 62 Ex parte and in camera proceedings63 raise different constitu-
tional questions. In the context of a Batson inquiry, the former raises a
due process issue. The latter implicates the defendant's right to be pres-
56. See infra notes 121-129 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 130-142 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
59. See U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
60. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (requiring some kind of
pretermination hearing) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); see
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) (notice, hearing and a legally competent tribu-
nal required by due process). See generally 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure
§ 11.1, at 9-11 (1984) (discussing criminal defendant's due process rights).
61. The Fourth Circuit, in two cases, upheld the trial court's ex parte examination of
the prosecutor's notes. See United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106-07 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 566
(1988). In dictum, however, the Fourth Circuit asserted that an adversarial hearing
should follow a prima facie showing, except where a compelling state interest exists. See
Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106.
62. See United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
143 (1988); United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 3234 (1987). In Davis, an opinion that set the precedent for allowing ex parte pro-
ceedings, the defendants contended that the district court erred by allowing the prosecu-
tion to explain its peremptory challenges in camera rather than on the record or in the
presence of defense counsel. See Davis, 809 F.2d at 1199. The defendants claimed that
such an error violated their right to be present at trial.
Although the Sixth Circuit addressed this claim, it failed to consider the ramifications
of defense counsel's exclusion from the proceeding. Even though the district judge had
heard defense counsel's arguments after he objected under Batson, the judge did not allow
defense counsel to actually hear or specifically rebut the prosecution's reasons for exercis-
ing peremptory challenges. The court's choice of an ex parte proceeding denied defend-
ant those opportunities and did not provide him with a fair hearing.
63. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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ent, derived from the sixth amendment's confrontation clause."
1. Ex Parte Proceedings
In an ex parte proceeding,65 the court hears only one party's presenta-
tion. This type of proceeding is disfavored because it denies notice and a
fair opportunity to be heard, thereby depriving the defendant of proce-
dural due process.6 6 Moreover, an ex parte proceeding "can create both
the appearance of impropriety and the possibility of actual miscon-
duct."' 67 Thus, ex parte proceedings usually occur only when extraordi-
nary conditions necessitate the other party's exclusion.68
Ex parte communications between judge and prosecutor are appropri-
ate in only limited circumstances. 69 They are necessary in some pretrial
or collateral proceedings to avoid the disclosure of sensitive information
in, for example, applications for a search warrant,70 certain discov-
64. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam). In some
instances, the due process clause also protects the right to be present "where the defend-
ant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him." See id.; infra note 85
and accompanying text.
65. Ex parte is defined as:
[o]n one side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the applica-
tion of, one party only.
A judicial proceeding, order, injunction, etc., is said to be ex parte when it is
taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and with-
out notice to, or contestation by, any person adversely interested.
Black's Law Dictionary 517 (5th ed. 1979). Ex parte hearings are defined as "hearings in
which the court or tribunal hears only one side of the controversy." Id.
66. See In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (2d Cir. 1977); Hailer v. Robbins, 409
F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 1969); see also Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 126-28 (1983) (per
curiam) (Stevens, J., concurring) (ex parte communication between judge and juror may
raise constitutional issue of defendant's due process right to notice and opportunity to be
heard).
67. United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Grieco v.
Meachum, 533 F.2d 713, 719 (1st Cir.) ("exparte communications shadow the impartial-
ity, or at least the appearance of impartiality, of any judicial proceeding"), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 858 (1976).
In addition, Canon 3A of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct dictates that "[a] judge
should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full
right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor
consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceed-
ing." ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(4) (1972).
68. See United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825
(1983); United States v. Persico, 349 F.2d 6, 13 (2d Cir. 1965).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1987) (ex parte
proceeding upheld where disclosing witness list to defendant could threaten witness'
safety); United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1975) (ex parte meeting
to consider whether to reveal government informant's identity to the defense), cert. de-
nied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976). These circumstances include the need to act quickly in issuing
temporary restraining orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
70. See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978).
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ery motions, 71  and motions to disclose privileged 72  or classified
information.73
An ex parte proceeding is inappropriate in the Batson context because
without defense counsel's assistance, the judge could erroneously accept
the prosecutor's facially neutral reasons for excluding certain jurors.74 A
judge not sufficiently familiar with the facts in the prosecutor's neutral
explanation may fail to perceive or may even overlook a pretextual rea-
son.75 Moreover, if a judge must ferret out the prosecutor's genuine mo-
tives, "[h]e would have to take on the role of defense counsel-inventing
possible arguments as to why the prosecutor's stated reasons might not
be sufficient-while at the same time keeping an open mind so as to rule
on the motion impartially. '76 If the judge hears the prosecutor's reasons
"behind closed doors" and rules that his justifications are legitimate, the
defendant and the excluded juror may doubt the judge's impartiality. 7 7
71. See, e.g., United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 824 (9th Cir.) (ex
parte review of Border Patrol report to determine whether it fell within rule of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139 (1985).
72. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings-Gordon, Witness, 722 F.2d 303, 309-10
(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (Ist Cir. 1984). It may be
argued that because a trial judge is trusted to make these kinds of pretrial determinations
without adversarial proceedings, he is also readily able to rule on a defendant's Batson
objection without holding a hearing. In addition, the judge supervises or participates in
the entire voir dire, observes the prosecutor's demeanor and hears his questions and state-
ments. This argument, however, does not consider the fact that in a Batson inquiry, no
need to avoid disclosure of sensitive or privileged information exists. Moreover, defense
counsel could apprise the judge of previous instances where the prosecutor exercised per-
emptory challenges solely on the basis of race.
74. Arguably, most prosecutors exercise peremptory challenges in good faith, and
therefore, a hearing is a waste of time because their neutral explanations will easily rebut
the defendant's prima facie showing. In fact, the Batson Court asserted that it had "no
reason to believe that prosecutors will not fulfill their duty to exercise their challenges
only for legitimate purposes." See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.22 (1986). This
argument, however, relies too heavily on the presumption of the prosecutor's good faith.
It fails to recognize that the use of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges persists.
As the Court acknowledged, "[t]he reality of practice, amply reflected in many state and
federal court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has
been, used to discriminate against black jurors." See id. at 99. Once a defendant makes a
prima facie showing, the prosecutor's good faith should no longer be assumed.
75. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1987). More-
over, "[a] judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept ... [a
facially neutral] explanation as well supported." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
76. Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1260; see also United States v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110,
1119 (7th Cir.) (in camera, and impliedly ex parte, communication "places a substantial
burden upon the trial judge to perform what is naturally and properly the function of an
advocate"), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970).
77. The Fourth Circuit recently upheld an ex parte, in camera submission of written
materials to supplement the prosecutor's explanations. Circuit Judge Murnaghan, dis-
senting, wrote:
[I]n our adversarial system, we ordinarily go to great lengths to ensure that
both sides have an equal opportunity to argue all points and all evidence before
a judge reaches his decision, and to ensure that such proceedings are open to the
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If defense counsel is not permitted to participate in the inquiry, the
prosecutor's unchallenged explanations may be less reliable and may ulti-
mately result in an inaccurate finding.78 When the court excludes de-
fense counsel without some overriding justification,79 it denies the
defendant procedural due process.80
2. In Camera Hearings
Unlike ex parte proceedings, in camera hearings may comport with
public. I see no reason to stray from the usual principles in the present contest.
Indeed, I would argue that openness and candor are even more important in a
Batson-type controversy than in most other situations. Anyone denied access to
purportedly exonerating materials cannot help suspecting the worst-the best
intentions of government counsel and the district court notwithstanding-it is
simply human nature to be suspicious when relevant data is withheld by a
decisionmaker.
United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 133 (4th Cir. 1988) (Murnaghan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
78. See Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1260-61.
79. A compelling government interest, however, may be present in rare instances and
justify an ex parte proceeding. One court has hypothesized that "if by coincidence the
government [was] conducting an undercover investigation of the juror's likely involve-
ment in other crimes," an ex parte hearing would be warranted. See United States v.
Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 566 (1988). The govern-
ment would have to "make a substantial showing of necessity" to justify such a hearing.
Id.; see Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1258-59.
The government may also have a compelling interest in not revealing sensitive written
materials. In Tindle, the Fourth Circuit upheld the ex parte, in camera submission of the
prosecutor's notes and other information that supplemented his explanation because por-
tions of the documents revealed the defendant's threats to certain individuals and might
have endangered them if made public. See United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 131
(4th Cir. 1988). Whenever possible, however, the court should redact the sensitive infor-
mation and make the remainder available to the defendant. See id. at 132 (Murnaghan,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
80. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1258-59, 1261 (9th Cir. 1987); see
also Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary
and Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 Va. L. Rev. 811, 833 (1988) (limiting Batson inquiry
to an ex parte proceeding does little for defendant's equal protection rights). One state
court observed that
Batson also implicitly approves inquiry into the legitimacy of the explanations
because otherwise Batson would become a right without a remedy. "Rubber
stamp" approval of all nonracial explanations, no matter how whimsical or fan-
ciful, would cripple Batson's commitment to "ensure that no citizen is disquali-
fied from jury service because of his race." Without some form of inquiry, a
prosecutor could easily conceal his true reason for removing black jurors by
simply inventing "neutral" reasons for the strikes. ("[A]ny prosecutor's office
could develop a list of 10 or 15 standard reasons for striking a juror....")
Batson would then merely reinstate, in another form, the "mission impossible"
of Swain. Batson surely cannot be read to produce such an anomalous result.
State v. Butler, 731 S.W.2d 265, 268-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted).
As Justice Marshall noted in Batson, "[i]f such easily generated explanations are suffi-
cient to discharge the prosecutor's obligations to justify his strikes on nonracial grounds,
then the protection erected by the Court today may be illusory." Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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due process requirements in the Batson context s.8  An in camera pro-
ceeding occurs when a judge communicates with a witness, party or
counsel either in chambers or some place not open to the public.82 The
sixth amendment confrontation clause,83 which confers the right to be
present to physically confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, is
implicated by such meetings.84 The central concern of the clause is to
ensure that the defendant has the opportunity to defend himself.8
Courts generally regard in camera hearings during a criminal trial as
improper and incompatible with the criminal justice system.8 6 Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has indicated that the right to be present is lim-
ited to those proceedings where the defendant may contribute to his
defense87 and has not forfeited the right by disruptive conduct.88 In an
oft-cited opinion, Justice Cardozo wrote that the defendant had a right to
be present at trial "to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only."8 9
Nonetheless, many courts have required the presence of defense coun-
sel when the defendant is absent from the in camera proceeding.90 In a
case where defense counsel, but not the defendants, were present at a
conference in chambers, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found
no constitutional violation because defense counsel protected their cli-
ents' interests.91 Therefore, although an in camera hearing is undesirable
81. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
82. See Black's Law Dictionary 684 (5th ed. 1979).
83. The confrontation clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S.
Const. amend. VI.
84. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
85. See id. at 106, 108. For example, absent a compelling governmental interest, the
accused's presence must be allowed at suppression hearings, see United States v. Clark,
475 F.2d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1973), during the impanelling of the jury, see United States v.
Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969), and at the
reading of additional jury instructions, see Evans v. United States, 284 F.2d 393, 394-95
(6th Cir. 1960).
86. See LaChappelle v. Moran, 699 F.2d 560, 566 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v.
Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1141 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1985) (fifth amendment
due process clause did not require defendant's presence at in camera conference regarding
juror's concern that defendant was sketching the jury); Snyder, 291 U.S. at 108 (no right
to be present at viewing of crime scene because defendant not confronting adverse wit-
nesses or aiding his defense).
88. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (right to be present waived by
disruptive conduct).
89. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 108.
90. See United States v. Boone, 759 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir.) (no error by excluding
defendant from in chambers conference regarding substitution of a juror because defense
counsel was present), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 861 (1985); United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d
980, 987 (6th Cir. 1978) ("An in-chambers conference concerning the dismissal of a juror
... is not a stage of the trial when the absence of the defendant would frustrate the
fairness of the trial so long as counsel for the defendant is present").
91. See Brown, 571 F.2d at 987; see also Ellis v. Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th
Cir. 1970) ("a criminal defendant does not have an absolute constitutional right to be a
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because it is not held in open court, it does not necessarily violate the
defendant's right to be present under the sixth amendment or offend due
process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 92
B. Title VII Analogy
In explaining the factors involved in a prima facie showing by the de-
fendant, the Batson Court repeatedly referred to Title VI1 3 decisions.94
The Court stated that its "decisions concerning 'disparate treatment'
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have explained the opera-
tion of prima facie burden of proof rules." 95 These references arguably
explain what procedures the Court envisioned for Batson cases.96
In Title VII cases, the Supreme Court, to ensure equal protection, es-
tablished procedural requirements for proving employment discrimina-
tion. The underlying goals of Title VII and Batson are substantially
similar-the elimination of discriminatory selection practices based on
impermissible classifications.97 Accordingly, the procedural standards
for Batson inquiries arguably must also secure equal protection. The
participant in such in camera discussions where his lawyer is present"), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1010 (1971). But see United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1143-44 (2d
Cir.) (defense counsel's absence from in chambers meeting did not violate defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978).
92. But as one district judge has stated, "ji]ustice must not only be done; it must be
seen to be done. The interest of justice requires more than a proceeding that reaches an
objectively accurate result; trial by ordeal might by sheer chance accomplish that. It
requires a proceeding that, by its obvious fairness, helps to justify itself." United States v.
McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 (E.D. La. 1974).
93. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)). In enacting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to ensure equal employment opportunity
and to eliminate discriminatory practices and barriers based on race or other impermissi-
ble classifications. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
Title VII applies to discrimination based not only on race but also color, religion, sex and
national origin. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1982).
94. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18, 96 n.19 (1986) (referring to United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
95. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18; see also United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010
(5th Cir. 1987) ("[t]aking our cue from Batson's repeated analogies to Title VII jurispru-
dence"); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 71, 542 A.2d 1267, 1277 (1988) ("As Batson has
referred us to them, we turn to the Title VII cases for the explanation of the operation of
prima facie burden of proof rules."); State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 63 (Mo. 1987) (en
banc) ("Batson intimates that it should be read side-by-side with the Supreme Court's
Title VII cases."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1755 (1988).
96. See Stanley, 313 Md. at 61-62, 71-72, 542 A.2d at 1272-73, 1277; Antwine, 743
S.W.2d at 63 ("Read together, these cases provide a relatively focused picture of the
procedural requirements of Batson at the trial level."); National Jury Project, Inc.,
Jurywork Systematic Techniques § 4.04[4], at 43 (1988) ("The opinion in Batson more or
less tracks [Title VII] stages of proof, but the language leaves it unclear whether a sepa-
rate third stage of surrebuttal is permitted.").
97. See supra note 93.
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Batson Court, therefore, drew an appropriate analogy to procedures used
in Title VII cases to prove invidious discrimination.9"
1. McDonnell Douglas: The Three-Stage Procedure
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green99 and its progeny, the Court
established three distinct procedural stages for proving discriminatory
employment practices."° First, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
a prima facie case of discriminatory intent."' Second, if the plaintiff
makes the requisite prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defend-
ant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the em-
ployee's rejection."' 02  Third, if the defendant's reason is deemed
nondiscriminatory, the plaintiff must have a fair opportunity to prove
that the reason proffered was a pretext for discrimination. 103
By requiring an initial burden of making a prima facie case and an
ultimate burden of proving discriminatory intent, courts can efficiently
screen out an employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for re-
jecting the plaintiff."° In effect, the ultimate burden of persuading the
court never shifts from the plaintiff-employee to the defendant-em-
ployer.'0 5 Since the ultimate burden rests with the plaintiff, he must have
an opportunity to prove that the proffered reason was pretextual or le-
gally insufficient. 106
The third step is crucial in Title VII cases because, even where the
defendant rebuts the presumption raised by the plaintiff's prima facie
case, the trier of fact still may consider the plaintiff's initial evidence and
effective cross-examination of the employer together to discredit the de-
fendant's explanation.'0
7
2. Applying Title VII Procedures to Batson Inquiries
Similar to the plaintiff-employee in Title VII cases, the Batson defend-
98. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
99. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
100. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
101. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The plaintiff must show "(i) that he
belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications." Id.
102. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
103. See id. at 804.
104. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
105. See id. at 253.
106. See id. at 256; National Jury Project, supra note 96, at 42-43 (defendant's burden
of rebutting prosecutor's reasons merges with ultimate burden of proving intentional
discrimination).
107. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
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ant has the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination.10 8
Consequently, the Batson defendant, like the Title VII plaintiff, should
have the opportunity to hear, respond to, and challenge the prosecutor's
proffered reasons before the trial court makes its final ruling. 0 9
In Title VII cases, the Supreme Court set out the basic allocation and
order of burdens and created a presumption of discriminatory treatment
by defining a prima facie case. Courts adhered to these procedural re-
quirements to assess and "progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the
elusive factual question of intentional discrimination."11 If the defend-
ant-employer carried the burden of proof and rebutted the prima facie
case, the "factual inquiry proceed[ed] to a new level of specificity" by
granting the plaintiff-employee a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the defendant-em-
ployer or that the explanation was unreliable." 1I
The three-stage procedure in Title VII cases provides an appropriate
model for Batson inquiries because it allows the party seeking relief to
prove that the proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination. With-
out this third stage, the complainant in both Title VII and Batson cases
would be unable to sustain his ultimate burden of proving intentional
discrimination. 112
To some trial courts, the requirement of yet another hearing may seem
unduly burdensome. Nonetheless, the Batson defendant should have a
full and fair opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's explanations because
the fundamental rights at stake in Batson hearings are identical to those
in Title VII cases, where surrebuttal is required. 113
III. POST-BATSON FEDERAL AND STATE COURT CASES
Federal and state courts that have addressed the issue of what proce-
dure should follow a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination
108. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986); Stanley v. State, 313 Md.
50, 61, 542 A.2d 1267, 1272 (1988).
109. See Stanley, 313 Md. at 62, 542 A.2d at 1272-73 ("We read Batson as allowing
rebuttal as per the Title VII cases.").
110. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8.
111. See id. at 255-56.
112. See supra notes 104-107, 74-80 and accompanying text.
113. Arguably, this analogy, although forceful, is inexact because Title VII and Batson
cases differ with respect to the context in which they occur. A Batson inquiry is usually a
pretrial proceeding during jury selection, before the defendant is tried for the alleged
crime. On the other hand, in Title VII cases, the procedural requirements pertain to
trials where the sole issue is whether discriminatory employment practices existed.
A Batson inquiry, however, is different from other pretrial or collateral proceedings
because it concerns an issue wholly unrelated to matters in the prosecution's case. When
a defendant objects under Batson, he asserts a violation of equal protection which arises
in a pretrial proceeding. A defendant may not bring a civil rights action because the
prosecutor's quasi-judicial activities are insulated by absolute immunity. See Imber v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). Because the defendant has no other practical
recourse, his Batson objection should be treated separately, and an adversarial hearing is
warranted.
19891
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can be separated into three groups. The first view permits hearings at the
trial court's discretion.1 14 The second approach approves of full eviden-
tiary hearings." 5 The third and most widely embraced view requires ad-
versarial hearings.116
A. Hearings at the Discretion of the Trial Court
Under the discretionary approach, the decision whether to conduct an
evidentiary hearing, an adversarial hearing, or no hearing at all is at the
trial court's discretion.117 The Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals reason that because Batson did not explicitly require any hearing
after the prosecutor's explanation, and because Batson declined to specify
procedures after a prima facie showing, the trial court has discretion to
determine whether to hold a hearing, and if so, what kind." 8
These courts, however, suggest that an adversarial hearing is preferred.
For example, despite finding that Batson did not require rebuttal by de-
fense counsel, the Seventh Circuit concluded that adversarial hearings
were the appropriate procedure in most Batson inquiries and should be
conducted by trial courts whenever possible.1 9
Among its advantages, the discretionary approach creates no adminis-
trative burden and respects the judge's ability to discern bad faith or
pretextual reasons. If a court does not conduct an adversarial hearing,
however, it denies the defendant a full opportunity to satisfy his eviden-
tiary burden.12 0
B. Evidentiary Hearings
In a typical evidentiary hearing, the defendant has the right to call
witnesses, including the prosecutor, and offer evidence. 2' If called, the
114. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 121-129 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 130-142 and accompanying text. Some courts refer only to the
defendant's right to rebut the prosecutor's reasons for exercising peremptory challenges.
Although these courts do not specifically address what type of hearing should be con-
ducted, the absence of imposing a full evidentiary hearing intimates that they would favor
an adversarial hearing.
117. See United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
143 (1988); United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1202 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3235 (1987).
118. See, e.g., Tucker, 836 F.2d at 340; Davis, 809 F.2d at 1202.
119. See Tucker, 836 F.2d at 340. In Davis, the Sixth Circuit declined to issue a per se
rule and limited its analysis to the case before it. See Davis, 809 F.2d at 1201. It also
noted that it was not concluding that rebuttal by defendants was always inappropriate.
See id. at 1202. The qualifications in these opinions demonstrate the courts' uneasy atti-
tude toward non-adversarial hearings.
120. See supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
121. Several courts have upheld the implementation of an evidentiary hearing or mini-
trial in which defense counsel cross-examines the prosecutor. See United States v.
Brown, 817 F.2d 674, 675 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96, 98
(E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1312 (1989);
Powell v. State, 182 Ga. App. 123, 124, 355 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1987); People v. Allen, 168 Ill.
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prosecutor must explain under oath why he struck the jurors and is sub-
ject to cross-examination.
In United States v. Biaggi,'22 a district court in the Second Circuit con-
ducted an evidentiary hearing 23 following a prima facie showing of im-
permissible peremptory challenges against Italian-American jurors.
Judge Weinstein emphasized that although the adversarial method of in-
quiry was time-consuming and cumbersome, it "help[ed] [the court] get
at the truth." '24 The court concluded that the administrative cost of
"defense counsel's vigorous and dogged questioning of the prosecutors"
was minimal."12
An evidentiary hearing in which defense counsel may cross-examine
the prosecutor provides the most rigorous truth-seeking procedure, and
thus best safeguards the defendant's equal protection right. Courts nev-
ertheless have rejected evidentiary hearings as being too intrusive and
disruptive. 2 6 One court even concluded that the cost of calling the pros-
ecutor as a witness outweighed any benefit obtained by his testimony.
127
Another disadvantage of an evidentiary hearing is that often it may delay
the principal trial' 2 because counsel will likely request a continuance to
call witnesses or submit affidavits and memoranda.
On balance, however, an evidentiary hearing, with its attendant for-
malities, secures the greatest protection of the defendant's equal protec-
tion right.'2 9 If court time were infinite, then it would not be
App. 3d 397, 402, 521 N.E.2d 1172, 1174 (1988); State v. Green, 324 N.C. 332, 378
S.E.2d 422 (1989); Yarbough v. State, 732 S.W.2d 86, 90-91 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), va-
cated on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (per curiam) (en bane).
122. 673 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1312 (1989).
123. Before the hearing, Judge Weinstein directed both counsel to submit memoranda
and affidavits and, if they wished, to provide witnesses. See id. at 98.
124. Id. (quoting United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Defense counsel's participation assisted the court by pointing out possible bad faith rea-
sons for the challenges and preserving facts for the record and a possible appeal. See id.
125. Id. The rationale for holding an evidentiary hearing is not explained in all cases.
The Georgia Court of Appeals remanded a Batson case for an evidentiary hearing to
decide whether the prosecutor's explanations were constitutionally sufficient. See Powell
v. State, 182 Ga. App. 123, 124, 355 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1987). The court may have been
influenced by the fact that the state's explanations at trial were contradicted by the record
before the court. See id. Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals noted that the trial court
had allowed defense counsel to cross-examine the prosecutor, but did not comment on
the appropriateness of this procedure. See Yarbough v. State, 732 S.W.2d 86, 90-91 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (per
curiam) (en bane).
126. See United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 130-31 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 566 (1988); State v. Jack-
son, 322 N.C. 251, 258, 368 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988). But see United States v. Thompson,
827 F.2d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1987) (administrative burden should not deny defendants
benefit of cross-examination and opportunity to offer contradictory evidence).
127. See Jackson, 322 N.C. at 258, 368 S.E.2d at 842.
128. See Tindle, 860 F.2d at 130-31 ("Batson does not require a trial within a trial
129. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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burdensome to hold such hearings. The reality of limited resources and
backlogged dockets, however, forces more practical choices. Fortu-
nately, a satisfactory alternative to evidentiary hearings is available.
C. Adversarial Hearings
In an adversarial hearing, the prosecutor explains his underlying rea-
sons for exercising peremptory challenges, and defense counsel attempts
to refute those reasons. Like the evidentiary hearing, the adversarial
hearing provides the trial judge with the "benefit of forceful arguments
by both sides."' 3° The adversary process allows defense counsel to rebut
a prosecutor's reason that appears to be pretextual or indicates bad faith.
For example, defense counsel can expose the fact that the prosecutor al-
lowed other potential jurors, who were similarly situated to the chal-
lenged juror, to serve on the jury.13 1  If a prosecutor bases his
explanations on his intuition that a juror would be partial because he is of
the same race as the defendant, defense counsel can refute the explana-
tion as being legally improper under Batson.'32 Additionally, defense
counsel can expose a prosecutor's concealed motive for removing the ju-
ror if the prosecutor's reason was part neutral and part improper. 133
Another benefit of the adversarial hearing is that it guarantees that the
prosecutor's exact reasons and defense counsel's rebuttal are preserved in
the record for a possible appeal. 134 This is especially important because
defense counsel is charged with making an adequate record at trial, and
the appellate court will only consider the record created during trial.135
If the trial court does not hold an adversarial hearing, the appellate court
would have no basis for reversal. Because counsel's arguments were
130. Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1258. The majority of cases addressing this issue have
determined that the defendant has a right to rebut the prosecutor's reasons for excluding
the jurors. Some of these decisions hold that Batson requires an adversarial hearing. See
United States v. Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Tindle, 860
F.2d 125, 131 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 566 (1988); United States v. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1987); Stanley
v. State, 313 Md. 50, 62, 542 A.2d 1267, 1273 (1988).
Other courts assert that the defendant should have an opportunity to rebut the prof-
fered explanation, but do not specifically mention an adversarial hearing. See United
States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 606, 612, vacated and reh'g granted, 861 F.2d 514 (8th Cir.
1988) (en banc); United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538, 1541 (1 lth Cir. 1987), cert.
dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 28 (1988), vacated in part on other grounds, 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.
1988); United States v. Wilson, 816 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1987); Williams v. State, 507
So. 2d 50, 53 (Miss. 1987); Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
131. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 1987).
132. See United States v. Alcantar, 832 F.2d 1175, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1987); Thompson,
827 F.2d at 1260.
133. See Alcantar, 832 F.2d at 1180; Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1261.
134. See Alcantar, 832 F.2d at 1180; Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1261.
135. See Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 871 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Fed. R.
App. P. 10(b)(2) ("If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion
is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.").
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BATSON HEARINGS
never heard or recorded, the appellate court would almost always sustain
the lower court's judgment.13 6
Adversarial hearings, however, create administrative costs-they re-
quire more time, are subject to abuse, and may require the prosecutor to
reveal case strategy.' 37 Yet a typical hearing could consist of the prose-
cutor's explanation followed by defense counsel's rebuttal, with duration
and scope prudently controlled by the court. 3 ' As the Ninth Circuit
insisted, "Adversary proceedings do in fact take more time, and they are
more cumbersome, but with good reason: The adversary process helps
us get at the truth."
3 9
Another argument against the adversarial hearing is that if the prose-
cutor's reasons are related to confidential matters of strategy, divulging
those reasons to defense counsel may prejudice the state's case."4 The
prosecutor's motives for striking jurors, however, are not usually strate-
gic.' Even if the prosecutor's reasons are strategy-related, the protec-
tion of the defendant's constitutional rights outweighs the minimal
burden caused by requiring the state to disclose its strategy.'42
In sum, an adversarial hearing, like an evidentiary hearing, grants de-
fense counsel an opportunity to provide the court with necessary infor-
mation to make its final determination. Defense counsel's arguments are
heard by the court and preserved on the record for appeal. Even though
an adversarial proceeding does not include cross-examination and offer-
ing evidence, the equal protection rights of the defendant and excluded
jurors, as well as the defendant's due process right, are protected by the
adversary process.
136. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986) (appellate courts should
usually defer to trial court's factual findings).
137. See Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1259.
138. See United States v. Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1989); Thompson, 827
F.2d at 1259-60.
139. Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1259. An adversarial hearing can be abused if defense
counsel tries to prolong it by charging, but not proving, improper motives. See id. at
1259-60. If this occurs, the trial judge can, at his discretion, restrict the scope, duration
and depth of the proceeding. See id.
140. See Thompson, 827 F.2d at 1259. Arguably, the prosecution would be deterred
from fully exercising its strikes for fear that it would have to reveal its case strategy. See
id.
141. See id. Instead, the strikes are usually motivated by the potential juror's previous
jury experiences, attitudes, profession or address. See id. Numerous factors influence the
prosecution's decision to use its peremptory challenges such as "current and past employ-
ment, general appearance and demeanor, previous jury service, and the absence or pres-
ence of apparent prejudice." See United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir.
1989). Requiring the disclosure of these reasons will not prejudice the state. See Thomp-
son, 827 F.2d at 1259.
142. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (use of peremptory challenges is
ultimately subject to the restraints of equal protection). Moreover, the prosecutor's strat-
egy may be readily apparent from his questions during voir dire. But see United States v.
Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 131-32 (4th Cir. 1988) (upheld ex parte examination of prosecutor's
notes discussing attempted intimidation by defendant and revealing strategy).
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CONCLUSION
The Batson Court, in reformulating the defendant's evidentiary burden
to prove purposeful discrimination, recognized that the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges persisted, and that the defendant's equal
protection rights were not sufficiently protected. Although the Court did
not specify the type of hearing that follows a prima facie showing, subse-
quent decisions demonstrate that a hearing must be adversarial to be fair.
To ensure that the greater protection afforded by Batson is effectuated,
lower courts must hold adversarial hearings in Batson inquiries, absent a
compelling state interest. These hearings should resemble the three-stage
procedure in Title VII cases in order to guarantee procedural due pro-
cess. Without an adversarial hearing, a defendant will not have a full
and fair opportunity to argue his equal protection claim.
L. Ashley Lyu
